Mohammad Ali Ghanamizadeh Fallahi
3-Mechanisms for Cadre Evaluation[1]
The promotion of political elites in China is neither a random process nor one based solely on unquestioning loyalty. Rather, it is conducted through a highly precise and multilayered performance evaluation system based on key performance indicators. This system enables the central government to shape the behaviour of millions of local bureaucrats and align their actions with national priorities.
Cadre evaluation is organised around five fundamental dimensions.
| Chinese Character and Pinyin | English Equivalent | Meaning and Indicators in the Bureaucratic Evaluation System of the Chinese Communist Party |
| 德, De | Virtue / Morality | This criterion represents absolute political loyalty to the ideals of the Party, practical commitment to its ideology, particularly Marxism and, more recently, Xi Jinping Thought, adherence to political red lines, and a strong commitment to serving the people. It receives considerable priority during the initial screening of candidates. |
| 能, Neng | Ability / Competence | This dimension includes professional and academic expertise, advanced managerial skills, organisational leadership capacity, and the political ability to manage crises, guide public opinion, and contain social unrest. |
| 勤, Qin | Diligence | This criterion refers to a highly dedicated work ethic, continuous hard work, a strong sense of responsibility, practical orientation, and willingness to maintain a direct presence in the field in order to confront challenges and solve problems at the frontline. |
| 绩, Ji | Achievement | This dimension concerns objective, tangible, and measurable work results. It carries the greatest weight in the final evaluation, usually between 60 and 70 percent. It includes quantitative indicators such as GDP growth, investment attraction, tax revenues, and, more recently, poverty reduction and improvements in environmental indicators. |
| 廉, Lian | Integrity / Incorruptibility | This criterion refers to the absence of involvement in financial corruption, transparency in personal financial affairs, a modest lifestyle, and strict avoidance of using state authority for personal or family interests. |
3-1- The Evaluation Implementation Process
These evaluations are conducted annually and also at the end of an official’s term of office. They are carried out by special inspection teams dispatched by the Organisation Department at a higher administrative level. The evaluation process includes several stages.
Democratic Appraisal, Minzhu ceping
These are meetings in which officials of an equivalent rank and subordinate cadres from different institutions, such as local people’s congresses or courts, assess the performance of the local leader on a rating scale ranging from excellent to poor.
Individual Interviews, Gebie tanhua
These are confidential interviews with colleagues and individuals connected to the cadre under evaluation. Their purpose is to identify possible weaknesses, misconduct, or violations.
Public Opinion Poll, Minyi diaocha
This stage involves collecting the views of representatives of local congresses and, in some cases, ordinary citizens regarding their level of satisfaction with the responsiveness and working style of the senior official.
Analysis of Actual Work Achievements, Shiji fenxi
This stage involves a precise quantitative assessment of the extent to which predetermined economic and social objectives have been achieved.
Although this complex system appears democratic, it is commonly described as consultative democracy. Its purpose is not to transfer political power to the public, but to establish a limited instrument of social supervision, obtain feedback, and prevent social tensions. The final decision, however, is always made by the relevant Party committee.
3-2-The Target Responsibility System
In order to operationalise the achievement criterion, the Chinese government introduced a system known as the Target Responsibility System in the mid1980s. Under this system, a formal agreement is concluded between a local official and the official’s superior. This agreement establishes fully quantified objectives for the coming year and assigns a specific weight to each objective. These objectives may include the value of industrial production, population growth rates, tax revenues, infrastructure investment, and retail sales. Financial rewards, penalties, and, most importantly, the promotion or demotion of bureaucrats are directly linked to the score obtained through this system.
4-The Driving Force of Development: Promotion Tournaments and Bureaucratic Markets
Perhaps the most important question concerning the Chinese economy is how a highly centralised system was able to generate such remarkable economic growth at the local level. The answer lies in a unique incentive structure that transformed bureaucrats from potential obstacles into driving forces of development.
4-1-The Promotion Tournament Model
Professor Zhou Li An of Peking University provided an influential academic explanation of this dynamic through his theory of the Promotion Tournament Model. Within a conceptual framework known as Regionally Decentralised Authoritarianism, the central government maintains a high degree of political centralisation while delegating extensive administrative and economic authority to provincial and municipal officials. Senior local officials within this system operate in a manner similar to the chief executive officers of competing companies. The central government organises a tournament among officials of equal administrative rank, such as the mayors of neighbouring cities within the same province. The local economy serves as the arena of competition, while the principal criterion for success, for several decades, was the rate of gross domestic product growth. Since opportunities for promotion to higher positions within the political hierarchy are highly limited, officials who record the highest economic growth compared with their competitors receive the ultimate reward, namely political promotion to the provincial or national level. Extensive empirical studies have demonstrated a positive and significant relationship between the economic performance of a city or province and the probability that its Party secretary or mayor will be promoted. This powerful incentive system encourages local officials to work continuously to develop industrial infrastructure, provide tax exemptions to attract foreign investment, and support local entrepreneurial firms.
4.2. The Concept of Bureaucratic Markets
The combination of intense political competition among bureaucratic officials seeking promotion and economic competition among commercial firms seeking profit has contributed to the emergence of the analytical framework of bureaucratic and economic markets. Within this model, bureaucratic competition for official positions becomes a form of market in itself. Yingyao Wang demonstrates that economic bureaucrats operating within the middle levels of the Chinese government develop competing policy paradigms in order to improve their own institutional position and achieve organisational hegemony. As a result, major economic reforms are often shaped by internal bureaucratic competition rather than merely by instructions issued from the top. Similarly, Yuen Yuen Ang explains through her Co evolutionary theory that, during the early stages of development, Chinese local officials used weak institutions and informal relationships inherited from the Maoist period as market creating institutions in order to attract capital. As markets expanded, new requirements emerged. These requirements encouraged bureaucrats to transform their practices towards standard Weberian models and market preserving institutions. This process illustrates the high degree of dynamism and adaptability within the Chinese bureaucracy.
4.3. Negative Consequences: Protectionism, Data Manipulation, and Inequality
Despite its remarkable achievements, the promotion tournament model based on gross domestic product has also generated significant costs and damaging unintended consequences.
Manipulation of Performance Data
Since promotion generally occurs after an official’s first term in office, local officials have strong incentives to manipulate and exaggerate gross domestic product growth statistics. Research indicates that such statistical exaggeration follows a political cycle and reaches its highest level during the fifth and final year of an official’s term. In some cases, deliberate overestimation may reach approximately 0.26 percent.
Local Protectionism
Since officials are evaluated according to their relative performance, they have little incentive to support economic growth in competing jurisdictions. Consequently, local officials may establish barriers to prevent the outflow of capital or the entry of competing firms from neighbouring cities. This phenomenon contributes to the inefficient allocation of resources at the national level, the construction of parallel industrial facilities, and the development of excess industrial capacity throughout the country.
Environmental Degradation and Inequality
The persistent and excessive pursuit of economic growth, often described as GDP-ism, encouraged officials for several decades to disregard the environmental and social consequences of industrial projects. This approach contributed to severe air and water pollution crises, as well as the expansion of economic and social inequalities between urban and rural regions.
[1] De-Neng-Qin-Ji-Lian
