The Philosophy of the Al-Nusra Front
The Al-Nusra Front emerged in the early stages of the Syrian civil war as the official branch of Al-Qaeda, changing its name and form over time to become Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). This transformation brought about a shift not only in organizational structure but also in ideological presentation. However, this evolution has not essentially changed the group’s core philosophy: radical Salafi-Jihadi ideology. Consequently, while the objective remains the same, the methods of achieving it have varied. The philosophy of Al-Nusra is based on Salafi thought, which rejects the modern nation-state system and instead advocates for a governance model based on Islamic Sharia (Kotoulas, 2018; 52). In this context, the idea of an Islamic state is constructed not just as a legal framework, but as a system encompassing all aspects of social and individual life. This understanding envisages the redefinition of religion around the principle of tawhid (oneness) and the liquidation of all religious practices and social forms deemed as bid’ah (innovation). Simultaneously, it defines democratic regimes, secular law, and secular education as taghuti (idolatrous) systems. This conception of political Islam ensures that the state is seen not merely as an apparatus of power, but as a mission structure that builds a community of believers. Within this system, the Muslim individual is positioned not just as a citizen, but as a servant subject to Sharia and an element obligated to support jihad. On this plane, the social structure is shaped by the exclusion of women from the public sphere, the absolute authority of men, moral policing practices, and Sharia-based punishment systems. In this framework, certain policies recently implemented by the Damascus regime point toward an Islam-based social engineering effort. Specifically, changes in the educational curriculum, the foregrounding of religious institutions, and the restriction of women’s roles in the public sphere provide clues to the construction of an authoritarian Islamist regime (Euro News, 2025).
The Transformation of HTS and Its Current Position
HTS is an organization that stands out for its evolutionary character while being among the most important armed structures influencing the course of the Syrian civil war. As the direct successor of the Al-Nusra Front—established after 2011 as the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda—HTS has aimed to move itself into a position that does not identify with classical jihadist structures by undergoing both ideological and operational transformations over time. The Al-Nusra Front appeared openly on the Syrian scene in 2012 and quickly became an effective fighting force against the regime. However, following the divergence with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), the organization announced in 2016 that it had ended its relationship with Al-Qaeda by taking the name Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (CSIS, 2018; 1). This step was part of an effort to shed the terrorist label at an international level and gain local legitimacy. By 2017, the structure took the name HTS as a result of a broader merger and developed a centralized authority structure under the leadership of Abu Mohammad al-Julani (Ahmed al-Shara), who continues to lead (Zeidan, 2025). The messages Julani has given to Western media and the international public, especially in the post-2020 process, demonstrate the organization’s effort to distance itself from classical Salafi-Jihadi discourse and position itself as a more “manageable” actor. Nevertheless, Julani still remains on the U.S. State Department’s terrorism list, and the reward placed on his head remains valid (ODNI, 2025). This situation indicates that the organization’s discourse of moderation has not found a corresponding reception in the international arena. The gradual evolution from a classical radical violence strategy to a governance-based model is strategic pragmatism. HTS attempts to project a corporate and rational image in both its local and global relations. Although it has not entirely abandoned its Salafi references ideologically, it is observed to have developed a discourse aimed at generating social support at the discursive level. This transformation process raises the question of whether the organization has deviated from its ultimate goal.
HTS and Julani in the Context of Terrorism Accusations
The ideological foundations and political vision of the Al-Nusra Front were shaped alongside the organization’s actions on the ground, revealing both the theoretical and practical aspects of the Islamist order it aimed to establish in Syria. However, this radical line drew the reaction of the international community and led to the association of the organization, and particularly its leader Abu Mohammad al-Julani, with terrorism. In this context, the contradictory transformation between the organization’s violence-based past and Julani’s increasingly moderate new discourse must be carefully analyzed in terms of both political strategy and identity reconstruction. Throughout the civil war, HTS did not only carry out an armed struggle against the Assad regime but also projected a profile that led to its international recognition as a terrorist organization due to its radical Islamist goals, practices toward the civilian population, and executions (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2023). The activities carried out by HTS in line with its radical Salafi-Jihadi ideology were shaped by practices such as infiltrating civilian governance structures in northern Syria, establishing alternative courts, collecting taxes—particularly in the Idlib region—excluding women from public spaces, and making religious education compulsory. These actions caught the attention of Western states and especially the USA; HTS and its leader Julani were placed on the U.S. State Department’s terrorism list, and programs promising rewards for information on Julani were initiated. With the collapse of the Assad regime and their seizure of control in late 2024, Julani began to act more like a political actor rather than a military leader, turning toward giving moderate messages targeted at the Western public. During this process, in interviews given to international media, Julani presented himself as a local actor seeking stability in Syria and began to stay away from discourses directly targeting democracy (Al Jazeera, 2024). Furthermore, by using the new name “Ahmed al-Sharari,” he entered into an effort to distance himself from the jihadi figure of his past. This stance should be evaluated not only as a personal reconstruction attempt but also as part of HTS’s strategy to gain international legitimacy. However, this tactical discourse of moderation contradicts the organization’s practices on the ground. HTS still implements oppressive policies against civil society in opposition areas, limits freedom of expression, and constructs an alternative Islamist legal order. In this respect, Julani’s discursive transformation should be viewed as an image policy developed to gain political ground rather than an ideological reform in practice. Ultimately, this strategy adopted by the HTS leadership reveals that a potential Salafi order to be established in Syria is being attempted not only through the force of arms but also through strategies of identity, discourse, and legitimacy. Julani’s effort to evolve from a terrorist to a political figure should be read not only as an individual transformation but also as an example of a political laboratory testing the limits of acceptance for radical Islamist movements by the West.
The Possibility of Islamist Governance in Syria
The collapse of the Assad regime at the end of 2024 and HTS taking over power in Damascus created a historical rupture in the Syrian political structure. This development did not only bring the end of the Assad regime but also presented a radical example of regime transformation in the Middle East, with a structure possessing a jihadist past assuming central governance at the capital level. Following the seizure of power by HTS, the first notable development was the relocation of the Idlib-based “Salvation Government” model to Damascus and the initiation of the reconstruction of administrative structures (The Washington Post, 2024). This new regime, in its initial phase, followed a mixed strategy to both create governance capacity and generate social support; while a system based on Sharia principles was systematically built, pragmatic alignment policies were also adopted. However, the fundamental orientation has been to establish a theocratic state order based on an Islamist ideology. Educational policies have become one of the most visible tools of this ideological transformation. Universities and schools in Damascus were restructured; secular and Western-sourced content was removed from the curriculum and replaced with courses centered on classical jurisprudence (fiqh), creed (aqidah), and political Islamic theory. Co-education was abolished, and gender norms in the education system were reorganized within a Salafi-Wahhabi framework (Yenil, 2025). At this point, while there is no direct contact between Türkiye and HTS, it is observed that Ankara follows a cautious pragmatism in the context of seeking stability in the region. With all these developments, HTS has become not just an armed group, but a structure that is ideologically consistent, institutionally organized, and develops pragmatist policies according to the conjuncture in line with its goals. This structure is step-by-step building its goal of establishing a type of Sunni Islamic Republic, deriving its legitimacy from the power balances on the ground and a Salafi understanding of Islam.
Potential Threat to Türkiye
With HTS seizing power in Damascus, a post-Baathist era has been entered in Syria, and the character of this new era is shaped around the claim of a radical Islamist organization to establish a political order. However, the long-term sustainability of this new regime faces serious structural challenges. First, the lack of institutional capacity constitutes one of the weakest links of the HTS regime. Regardless of how strong the organization’s ideological motivation and desire to build social order may be, the ability of such structures to establish an administration suitable for modern state functioning is limited. Secondly, the ideological integrity of HTS is fragile despite its pragmatism. The transformation experienced from Al-Nusra to today shows that the organization occasionally makes concessions from its radical Salafi line. This situation could make it difficult for the regime to progress on a stable ideological ground.
From Türkiye’s perspective, the HTS regime poses a direct security threat. Although Ankara anticipates that the regime will not show a tendency toward direct attacks on the Turkish border in the initial stage, HTS’s radical ideology could, over time, become influential over Salafi groups in Türkiye. Particularly, political, ideological, and military tensions that may arise between Damascus and the regions in northwestern Syria where Türkiye is influential could confront Ankara with the option of a new cross-border intervention. Furthermore, the presence of Syrian migrants in Türkiye and individuals of Syrian origin who have obtained citizenship could carry the mentioned tension inside the borders. Therefore, HTS’s efforts to recruit followers and organize among persons of Syrian origin in Türkiye have the potential to increase the internal security threat.
Conclusion
The Al-Nusra Front and HTS, located at the center of the complex power struggles birthed by the Syrian civil war, have exhibited a multi-layered organizational identity that must be analyzed not only in military but also in ideological and political dimensions. Having been born as a radical Salafi-Jihadi structure affiliated with Al-Qaeda, HTS has not deviated from its goal of establishing a political order based on Islamic Sharia, despite the changes in name, discourse, and strategy it has undergone over time. This goal was materialized through the organization’s practices on the ground and its attempts to build a political society; HTS has become an actor directly holding power, especially with the collapse of the Damascus regime. The moderate image policies developed under Julani’s leadership should be read as part of the efforts to remove the organization from international terror lists. However, since discursive flexibility has not been reflected in the practices on the ground, this strategy failed to find a response from the international community; HTS has maintained its status as a structure known for its past of radical Islamist violence and viewed as a security threat. This situation shows that the organization is caught between its ideological pragmatism and strategic consistency. The new HTS regime, which began to take shape with the post-Baath era in Damascus, raises serious questions about what kind of future an Islamist governance model promises in a structure as fragile as Syria—ethnically, transitionally, and politically. This structure, which has high ideological motivation, is in serious dilemmas regarding institutional capacity, governance ability, and social legitimacy. The balance sought between the Salafi line and modern state practices may give rise to both internal instability and external intervention risks in the long run. For Türkiye, it is seen that this new era contains multidimensional security threats. The possibility of HTS’s radical ideology spreading to Türkiye’s border regions produces risks not only at the military level but also at the sociological and ideological levels. Its potential influence on Salafi-leaning groups in Türkiye, the possibility of organizational structuring within the Syrian migrant population, and the escalation of cross-border tensions necessitate Ankara to develop new openings in its internal and external security policies.
In conclusion: the Islamist regime that HTS is trying to establish in Syria shows that classical jihadi structures can evolve into hybrid actors seeking legitimacy. However, instead of reducing risks for international security, this transformation makes them more complex; it reveals that radical ideologies continue their existence through new strategic forms. For this reason, the HTS regime stands before us as a structure that must be carefully monitored for the future of not only Syria but also the region and Türkiye.
References
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Kotoulas, I. E. (2018). Ideological Principles of Jabhat Al-Nusra in Al Risalah Magazine. Civitas Gentium, Vol: 6, No: 2, 49-60.
ODNI. (2025). Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Office of the Director of National Intelligence: https://www.odni.gov/nctc/terrorist_groups/hts.html
The Washington Post. (2024, Aralık 11). After toppling Assad, can Syria’s rebels rebuild a shattered state? The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/11/syria-rebels-hts-jolani-government-assad/
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Yenil, N. (2025, Şubat 13). Suriye’de kadınları ne bekliyor? Yurtsever: https://yurtsever.org.tr/2025/suriyede-kadinlari-ne-bekliyor-542556/
Zeidan, A. (2025, Haziran 6). Ahmed al-Sharaa. Britannica: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ahmed-al-Sharaa
Photograph: Anadolu Agency
