Mohammad Ali Ghanamizadeh Fallahi
Introduction
The stunning and unprecedented development of the People’s Republic of China over the past four decades is considered one of the most complex and important political-economic phenomena in the modern era. While many international observers and analysts reduce this success simply to factors such as economic liberalization, the entry of foreign direct investment, and cheap labor, the deeper roots of this structural transformation must be found in its governance architecture, political meritocracy, and the highly complex and institutionalized mechanisms for training and promoting elites.
By uniquely combining ancient Confucian philosophical traditions, centralized Leninist organizational structures, and competitive quasi-market mechanisms within its massive bureaucracy, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has created a system capable of simultaneously exercising centralized political control and generating decentralized economic flexibility and dynamism. This article takes an analytical and in-depth approach to examine the various dimensions of this system. From the historical and philosophical roots of the imperial examinations to the modern mechanisms of evaluating officials, the rise and evolution of technocrats, the transition from a paradigm of mere growth to sustainable development, and finally, the structural challenges and the puzzle of authoritarianism under Xi Jinping’s leadership—all are explored within this framework.
1. Historical and Philosophical Foundations: From Confucianism to the Imperial Examinations
A correct understanding of China’s modern meritocratic system and the political legitimacy of the Communist Party is impossible without a deep knowledge of its historical and cultural foundations, especially Confucian philosophy and the thousand-year-old imperial examination system. The concept of meritocracy in China is not an imported modern phenomenon, but a governance tradition dating back over two thousand years that has always acted as a key tool for integrating the empire and legitimizing power.
1.1. Confucianism and the Doctrine of Promoting the Worthy [1]
China’s political and social tradition is deeply intertwined with the teachings of Confucius (551-479 BC). At the core of this school of thought is the fundamental belief that political power and government positions should not be distributed based on wealth, noble blood, or inheritance, but must be granted exclusively based on “virtue and ability.” The concept of promoting the worthy and the idea of governance based on moral virtue [2]form the foundation of Confucian political thought. Unlike European societies, which until recent centuries were dominated by feudal systems and hereditary nobility, Chinese thinkers and leaders believed that rulers should be chosen from among men with the highest moral and intellectual capacities.
In this intellectual system, the ruler’s authority was justified through a concept called the “Mandate of Heaven.” However, this divine mandate was not absolute; it was conditional on ensuring the welfare of the people, maintaining social order, and the ruler’s moral governance. If a ruler lost these virtues, the Mandate of Heaven was revoked, and the people’s right to rebel was recognized.
In the modern era, the Chinese Communist Party has had a highly contradictory and fluctuating approach toward Confucianism. During Mao Zedong’s era, and particularly during the Cultural Revolution, Confucian teachings were widely attacked and destroyed as symbols of feudal backwardness, reactionism, and class oppression. However, since the 1980s with the beginning of economic reforms—and specifically during the leadership of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping—the Party has purposefully revived this school of thought. By introducing concepts such as a “Harmonious Society,” Party leaders have attempted to use Confucian teachings (such as respect for hierarchy, social discipline, loyalty to family and government, and prioritizing collective interests over individual ones) to create a new source of ideological legitimacy beyond orthodox Marxism. In this context, the concept of harmony is used not as forced uniformity, but as a tool to maintain social stability (Shehui Wending) against growing economic inequalities.
1.2. The Imperial Examination System [3]and the Institutionalization of Meritocracy
The abstract, meritocratic ideas of Confucianism were turned into a tangible bureaucratic reality through the institutionalization of the imperial civil service examination system, known as Keju. The roots of this system date back to the Han Dynasty (206 BC to 220 AD); when Emperor Wu established an imperial university in 124 BC to train officials based on Confucian texts, and later in 165 BC, began recruiting personnel through written exams. However, the Keju system became a systematic institution and the formal, dominant method for hiring bureaucrats during the Sui (581-618) and Tang (618-907) dynasties, reaching its ultimate evolution during the Song and Ming dynasties.
In theory, Keju was an egalitarian system that allowed any adult Chinese man—regardless of social class, family background, or wealth—to achieve the highest government positions by proving his academic and intellectual merit. These exams were organized around mastering the six classic Confucian texts, literature, calligraphy, and policy-making strategies. They were held at four levels: local (county), provincial, metropolitan (capital), and national (in the presence of the emperor).
To ensure objectivity and prevent corruption, complex control systems were invented. The answering format was standardized into “eight-legged essays.” Candidates were locked in small solitary cells for days, exam papers were identified by numbers instead of names, and before grading, the answer sheets were rewritten by a third party so the candidate’s handwriting could not be identified by the examiner, thereby eliminating the possibility of influence or cheating.
This system had profound and long-term consequences for Chinese society. Success in these exams required years of grueling study from childhood and led to the rise of a powerful new class of scholar-bureaucrats (scholar-gentry) who gradually replaced the hereditary nobility and military powers. Statistics show that this system largely achieved its goal of social mobility; for example, during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), about 47 percent of those who successfully passed the highest level of the exam[4] came from families with no official connections or government history.
In addition to its administrative functions, the Keju system ensured an unparalleled cultural, linguistic, and ideological integration across the vast Chinese empire. By distributing passing quotas based on provincial populations, the central government won the loyalty of local elites across the country. This system, which lasted until its abolition in 1905, not only influenced the administrative structures of neighboring countries like Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, but as China’s most important intellectual export, it also inspired 19th-century British reformers to create a merit-based civil service system in Britain.
Today, the psychological and structural legacy of Keju strongly lives on in the university entrance exam system [5]and civil service employment exams. The Gaokao is perceived by the masses as the modern manifestation of Keju, and its continuation has helped the Communist Party strengthen its political legitimacy in the eyes of society by linking itself to the traditional culture of examinations and meritocratic advancement.
2. Party Organizational Architecture: The Nomenklatura System and the Central Organization Department
China’s modern meritocratic system is a complex combination of Confucian ideals and strict Leninist organizational principles. In this system, there is no separation between politics and administration; the Communist Party maintains exclusive oversight over all key national appointments, thereby ensuring unified political discipline and executive efficiency. The fundamental principle, which is also enshrined in the Party’s constitution and repeatedly emphasized by leaders like Xi Jinping, is the principle that “the Party manages the cadres”.[6]
2.1. The Concept of “Cadre” in Party Literature
Unlike ordinary civil servants in Western democracies, who are merely considered impartial implementers of policies, a “cadre” [7]holds a deeper meaning in the literature of the Chinese Communist Party. Based on the Leninist concept of the vanguard, a cadre is a full-time, professional revolutionary who dedicates themselves to the Party’s goals and operates at the discretion of the leadership. This term, which was first used at the Party’s Second National Congress in 1922, refers to personnel responsible for managing the affairs of the government, the military, educational institutions, and even state-owned enterprises. Cadres are trained not only to be efficient and reliable managers but also to demonstrate unwavering loyalty to the Party’s policies and the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics.
In the early years following the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, due to post-civil war conditions, political loyalty was generally measured based on revolutionary combat records, class background (peasants and workers), and military command ability, with academic education taking a back seat. However, with the beginning of the reform era in the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping introduced new criteria known as the “four standards” [8]for cadres, aiming to rapidly modernize the country. Accordingly, cadres had to be more revolutionary, younger, more educated, and more professionally competent. This policy meant combining the concept of “red” (political loyalty) and “expert” (administrative and technical ability) [4], which led to the forced retirement of many elderly Mao-era cadres and the widespread entry of academic elites into the system.
2.2. The Central Organization Department and the Nomenklatura System
The beating heart and driving engine of personnel management in China is the Central Organization Department of the Communist Party’s Central Committee[9]. This powerful, highly secretive, and vital institution, which serves as the equivalent of a human resources department for the entire country, is responsible for implementing and overseeing the “Nomenklatura” system.
The Nomenklatura system, modeled after the Soviet Union, consists of a list of key leadership positions across all pillars of society whose appointment, promotion, demotion, and dismissal are exclusively controlled by the Party. In addition to the list of positions, this system includes a roster of reserve cadres who have the potential to fill these roles in the future. The Central Organization Department directly controls approximately 5,000 senior national positions. These roles include ministers, deputy ministers, party secretaries and governors of all provinces, presidents of top national universities, editors-in-chief of state media, and the CEOs of the largest state-owned enterprises.
2.3. The 1984 Reforms: The Principle of “Managing One Level Down”
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Communist Party applied a centralized system in which central authorities controlled appointments up to two levels down in the administrative hierarchy. However, as the bureaucracy expanded and economic reforms began, this intense centralization became an executive bottleneck. In 1984, to meet the needs of the new economic system, the Party implemented a fundamental administrative reform and introduced the principle of “managing one level down” [10].
Based on this principle, the Central Organization Department limited its direct control to positions just one level below it (such as provincial officials and ministers) and delegated the authority for next-level appointments to the respective lower party committees. As a result, provincial committees became responsible for managing officials at the county level, and counties took charge of managing officials at the township level. This cascading structure brought about significant administrative decentralization, which was essential for advancing economic reforms. At the same time, it ensured that ideological and political loyalty flowed continuously from the top down through all administrative arteries of the country, and that the ambition of cadres was always directed toward satisfying their superiors.
Closely related to the Nomenklatura system is the concept of Bianzhi. Bianzhi is a list of approved personnel quotas and the authorized number of employees in government agencies, public institutions, and party organizations. This is determined by the central government to control the ceiling for state hiring. While the Nomenklatura targets leadership positions, Bianzhi regulates the overall structure of the staff and expert workforce.
Notes:
[1] Shangxian
[2] Dezhi
[3] Keju
[4] Jinshi
[5] Gaokao
[6] Dang guan ganbu
[7] Ganbu
[8] Sihua fangzhen
[9] You hong you zhuan
[10] Zhongzubu
Photograph: Anadolu Agency
